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Plans for a banking union may not be enough to tackle the
eurozone’s economic crisis.
Blog Admin
Many commentators advocate a banking union as a partial solution to the eurozone crisis,
arguing that it will break the ‘vicious circle’ between weak banks and weak sovereigns.
Looking at the current role of the European Stability Mechanism, Sony Kapoor and
Charles Goodhart write that a banking union may prove ineffectual because equity cannot
be injected into weak banks or be used to tackle past losses, and could not be used without
a sovereign guarantee. Instead of potentially increasing their liability, they propose that
sovereigns should be shored up so they are better able to support weakened banks.
Af ter a year in which European Union policy makers spent much time obsessing about
banking union, it is t ime to take stock of  the discussion. The question today is not about
the intellectual case f or a more unif ied approach to bank regulation and supervision
within a single-currency area such as the eurozone. That case is still strong. Rather, it is
about if  what is being pedalled as a ‘banking union’ will deliver the goods — whether it will
help tackle the economic crisis that still looms large over Europe or not. Evidence is now
stacking up that it will not.
The EU’s banking union was sold as a means to break the “vicious circle” connecting weak banks and
weak sovereigns — and to do so quickly. As a way to mitigate the risks that troubled banks pose and
weak sovereigns pose to each other, however, the plan is looking more inef f ectual by the day. Although
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can inject capital into struggling banks, a number of  caveats
apply.
The f irst is that equity can only be
injected into viable banks, and not the
“bad banks” that various states have
set up to wind down problem assets
and reduce uncertainty in the f inancial
system. The problem here is that it is
exactly in these bad banks that losses
are likely to arise. Under the current
plan, these losses would need to be
absorbed by the member states in
question, adding signif icantly to their
government debt.
The second is that equity injections are
not allowed to tackle “legacy losses.”
Given that large losses have already
materialised and been recognised in
banking systems in Ireland, Spain and
Cyprus, this severely limits the usef ulness of  any direct injection of  ESM equity. In f act, it ’s f air to say
that if  we did not have a legacy-asset problem, the euro crisis would not exist.
The third and perhaps most pernicious element is that equity injections would not be made without a
sovereign guarantee indemnif ying the ESM against any losses. That means the risks of  such an exercise
still lie f ully with the sovereign. The only thing this will accomplish is that crisis countries’ reported debt-
to-GDP ratios will look a bit lower than if  those countries had been f orced to borrow money and rescue
banks on their own. While this “of f -balance sheet accounting” could have f ooled markets 10 years ago, it
will not work now.
What of  the risks to banks posed by weak states? First, there is the on-going exposure of  banks to
macroeconomic risks in their home countries which is hard to mitigate. Equally important, national
governments continue to provide, in various f orms, explicit and implicit guarantees to banks. If  the credit
of  a state such as Spain or Greece is in doubt, depositors in those countries can no longer rely on
those governments’ deposit insurance programmes, f or instance. Hence the importance of  the plan f or a
pan-European deposit-guarantee programme — which now seems to have been kicked into the long
grass.
The f ragility of  the current construction can be seen by the f act that, if  a German bank with branches in
Spain were to launch an advertising blitz of f ering Spanish depositors the saf ety of  German-government
deposit insurance, there is lit t le that supervisors could do to stop tens of  billions of  deposits leaking
away f rom even the stronger Spanish banks.
In the immediate af termath of  Lehman’s collapse, many EU states launched schemes that allowed their
banks to issue state-guaranteed bonds. More than €700 billion of  such debt was issued by 2010. The
expiration of  these schemes, and doubts about the creditworthiness of  certain sovereigns, led the
European Banking Association to propose a pan-European f unding-guarantee scheme. This was
considered polit ically unpalatable by stronger member states, and the credit crunch necessitated the
European Central Bank’s two Long-Term Ref inancing Operations (LTRO). But banks used a signif icant
portion of  LTRO f unds to increase their holdings of  home countries’ government bonds, particularly in
troubled EU economies—thereby reinf orcing the link between sovereigns and banks.
While it is easy to think of  weak banks in sovereigns with strong economies, it is almost impossible to
visualise a scenario where banks thrive in a troubled home economy. Even under the best case scenario
of  the on-going banking union discussions, weak sovereigns and troubled banks will stay locked in
a dance of  death. Yet, European policy makers continue to waste their t ime on something that is now a
banking union in name only. Focusing on providing low-cost f unding support to troubled sovereigns as
they undergo structural adjustment may be a better use of  their scarce time and resources.
Shoring up troubled sovereigns would help reduce macroeconomic risks and improve the credibility of
implicit and explicit sovereign support. Restoring growth is the best way to change the dance of  death to
a dance of  lif e, where a strengthening economy and healthier banks reinf orce each other. It ’s t ime to
move on f rom the sham the banking union discussion has now become.
Note: The anointment of  the ECB as the supervisor f or the largest eurozone banks can help with the
present crisis if  it  cracks down on national regulatory actions which may be sensible individually but
collectively problematic. In a bid to saf eguard their national banking systems, many European regulators
have been leaning on banks to hoard liquidity and minimise exposure to crisis-hit countries. This has
accentuated the eurocrisis. The ECB would presumably be able to crack down on these actions.
However, it is certainly not necessary to go through the polit ical contortions that a banking union entails,
in order to mitigate such problematic behaviour. The European Commission already has the authority to
take action and a ‘comply or explain’ letter  sent to national regulators is a f irst step in this direction.
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